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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Joseph Mobley appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence for felony
domestic battery following a jury trial. 1 The district court in this case, when confronted
with the information that the jury was split on one of the charges and did not know how
to proceed, instructed the jury to consult only one paragraph of a single jury instruction
and to continue to deliberate. This paragraph instructed the jurors to consult with one
another and consider each other's views with the objective of reaching a verdict. The
district court did not instruct the jurors to consider the paragraph that followed, which
instructed the jurors not to surrender their individual opinions solely for the purpose of
returning a unanimous verdict; did not inform the jurors that a unanimous verdict was
not required; and did not direct them to consider the remaining jury instructions. The
district court also took this action unilaterally and did not consult with trial counsel for
Mr. Mobley or the State until after the court had already directed the jurors to consider
this single paragraph and ordered them to continue deliberating. Mr. Mobley asserts
that this instruction constituted an impermissible "dynamite" instruction that violated his
constitutional right to due process and that requires reversal of his judgment of
conviction and sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Joseph Mobley was charged with attempted strangulation and felony domestic
battery.

(R., pp.20-21.) The State further sought an enhancement on the charge of

1

Mr. Mobley was also charged by the State with attempted strangulation, but was
subsequently acquitted of this charge at trial.

1

domestic battery due to the State's claim that the alleged battery occurred within the
presence of a minor child. (R., pp.22-23.) These charges were based on an alleged
altercation that took place between Mr. Mobley and his then- girlfriend, Laurel Deboi,
who shared a residence with Mr. Mobley and with whom she had a child in common.
(R., pp.6-8.)
At Mr. Mobley's first trial on these charges, the jury was unable to reach a verdict
as to any of the alleged offenses, and further could not reach a verdict as to any of the
lesser included offenses of the domestic battery charge. (R., pp.39-53.) After finding
that the jury was deadlocked and further deliberations would be futile, the trial court
declared a mistrial. (R., pp.50-51.)
Prior to the retrial, the State filed two motions in limine with the district court.
(R., pp.56-64.) In the first, the State asked the district court to issue an order prohibiting
Mr. Mobley from testifying at trial about whether Ms. Deboi took property from their
apartment or withdrew funds from Ms. Deboi and Mr. Mobley's joint account after
Mr. Mobley was arrested.

(R., pp.56-58.) The State argued that this evidence was

irrelevant and posed the danger of confusing the jury as to the disputed issues at trial.
(R., pp.56-58.)
In the State's second motion in limine, the State asked the court to preclude
Mr. Mobley from presenting any evidence at all about "specific incidences [of] physical
or verbal aggression or acts committed in the past between the victim or irrelevant
character evidence of the victim." (R., pp.60.) The State contended that such evidence
was irrelevant, posed the danger of confusing the jury, and was impermissible character
evidence under I.R.E. 608(b). (R., pp.60-64.)

2

The State reiterated its request at the hearing on the State's motions in limine.
(3/18/11 Tr. 2 , p.1, L.4 - p.3, L.19.) At this hearing, the State also clarified that it was
seeking to exclude evidence of Ms. Deboi's past acts of violence and history of physical
altercations on the basis of I.R.E. 402(b), rather than 608(b). (3/18/11 Tr., p.2, L.19 p.3, L.13.) Mr. Mobley pointed out that much of the evidence disputed by the State
came in at his prior trial for reasons unrelated to the grounds upon which the State
objected, including Ms. Deboi's potential motive as a witness for the State and as
impeachment of her credibility. (3/18/11 Tr., p.3, L.21 - p.4, L.25.) The district court
denied the State's motion seeking to preclude Mr. Mobley from eliciting testimony about
Ms. Deboi having taken Mr. Mobley's personal property and money, but delayed ruling
on whether Mr. Mobley could elicit evidence of Ms. Deboi's history of violence until trial.
(3/18/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.1-6.)
Ms. Deboi was the first witness presented for the State at Mr. Mobley's trial. She
testified that she and Mr. Mobley were in a dating relationship, shared a child in
common, and lived together at the time of the alleged battery. (Trial Tr., p.129, L.14 p.131, L.25.) On the day of the altercation, Ms. Deboi testified that she and Mr. Mobley
had been fighting throughout the day and that Mr. Mobley had also been drinking. (Trial
Tr., p.132, L.17 - p.134, L.2.)

At some point during the evening hours, Ms. Deboi

alleged that her dispute with Mr. Mobley turned physical. (Trial Tr., p.134, L.23 - p.135,
L.2.)

Ms. Deboi testified that she and Mr. Mobley were in their bedroom at the time.
(Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.3-5.) According to Ms. Deboi, her and Mr. Mobley's bedroom also

2

Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this case, and for
ease of reference, citations made herein to the transcripts of proceedings other than the
trial transcript are made in accordance with the date of the proceeding transcribed.
3

contained the dining room area, as well as their daughter's bed, a computer desk, and a
sofa.

(Trial Tr., p.136, L.19 - p.138, L.12.) The argument between them escalated

when Mr. Mobley was having a difficult time getting their daughter to eat.

(Trial

Tr., p.138, L.14 - p.139, L.6.) According to Ms. Debo i's testimony, Mr. Mobley set their
daughter on her bed and then turned and pushed Ms. Deboi into a nightstand. (Trial
Tr., p.139, L.21 - p.140, L.5.)
Ms. Deboi testified that Mr. Mobley then kicked her between her neck and
shoulder blade and knocked her to the ground. According to her testimony, Mr. Mobley
then kicked her several more times in the head, stomach, and legs. (Trial Tr., p.140,
Ls.9-25.) Ms. Deboi also testified that she saw Mr. Mobley's other daughter peeking
through the doorway to the bedroom from further down the hallway. (Trial Tr., p.141,
Ls.1-3.)
Mr. Mobley left the room to try to make a phone call, according to Ms. Deboi's
testimony, but returned after being unable to make the call.

(Trial Tr., p.141, L.23 -

p.143, L.3.) During this time, Ms. Deboi was packing a suitcase in order to leave the
apartment. (Trial Tr., p.141, L.23 - p.143, L.3.) Ms. Deboi testified that, upon turning
back to the bedroom to finish packing, Mr. Mobley was behind her and grabbed her by
the throat. (Trial Tr., p.143, L.13 - p.144, L.9.) He then left the room and she continued
to pack a suitcase. (Trial Tr., p.144, Ls.10-13.) Ms. Deboi then claimed that Mr. Mobley
hit her in the eye with a closed fist when she went to a closet to grab a sweatshirt. (Trial
Tr., p.144, Ls.14-23.)

Ms. Deboi did not call the police at this point, but left the

apartment with her daughter. (Trial Tr., p.145, L.18 - p.146, L.10.) She also claimed
that Mr. Mobley had broken her cell phone "in half" before Ms. Deboi had the chance to
leave the apartment. (Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.5-7.)
4

After leaving the apartment, Ms. Deboi first stopped at a neighbor's house, Lisa
Voss, to tell them that she and Mr. Mobley would probably not be attending a barbeque
that was planned for the following day. (Trial Tr., p.146, L.17- p.147, L.14.) She then
went to the house of her friend, Marissa Hone. (Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.8-14.) While there,
Ms. Deboi decided to go to the hospital, although she did not call the police.

(Trial

Tr., p.148, L.24 - p.150, L.12.)
Following her trip to the hospital, Ms. Deboi testified that she retrieved her and
Mr. Mobley's daughter and then stayed at her brother's house. (Trial Tr., p.150, L.20 p.151, L.14.)

The following day, Ms. Deboi acquired a new cell phone and then

returned to her apartment to take some items. (Trial Tr., p.151, L.17 - p.152, L.8.) She
also withdrew approximately $2,500 from her and Mr. Mobley's joint bank account.
(Trial Tr., p.153, L.10 - p.154, L.1.)

Ms. Deboi testified that she paid bills with this

money. (Trial Tr., p.154, Ls.2-3.)
Regarding her injuries, Ms. Deboi testified that she was bruised around her eye,
neck, arms, and legs. (Trial Tr., p.154, L.15 - p.155, L.3.) The State also submitted
photographic exhibits of these injuries that were taken approximately one week after the
alleged altercation. (Trial Tr., p.155, L.4 - p.158, L.1.)
On

cross-examination,

Mr.

Mobley

drew

out

several

inconsistencies

between Ms. Deboi's trial testimony and prior versions of events that she had provided
to police and during court proceedings. First, Mr. Mobley noted that the photographic
exhibit of the bedroom shared by Ms. Deboi and Mr. Mobley did not show any
disturbance of the furniture that would accompany an extended physical struggle. (Trial
Tr., p.158, L.15 - p.159; State's Exhibit 1.) Ms. Deboi claimed this was due to the fact
that Mr. Mobley only pushed her once into the night stand, and that he did not push her
5

very hard. (Trial Tr., p.159, Ls.1-15.) She claimed that nothing in the room appeared to
be disturbed by the other alleged incidents of violence because she did not fight back.
(Trial Tr., p.159, Ls.12-24.)
However, Ms. Deboi subsequently acknowledged that, in her sworn statement
when seeking a protection order, she claimed that Mr. Mobley had pushed her into
several objects throughout the bedroom. (Trial Tr., p.160, L.5 - p.162, L.5.) Ms. Deboi
also admitted that she had not immediately told Ms. Hone or the police about being
choked, and told an officer that she had been choked only when he prompted her about
whether that had occurred. (Trial Tr., p.163, L.7 - p.164, L.1.)
When asked why she did nothing to fight back or seek to defend herself during
the alleged battery, Ms. Deboi testified that this was because she loved Mr. Mobley and
because she was "not a violent person."

(Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.6-10.)

But Ms. Deboi

admitted thereafter that she was fired at one of her jobs for shoving another man into a
wall, and was kicked out of a fast food restaurant for getting into a verbal fight with an
employee there. (Trial Tr., p.170, L.11 - p.171, L.24.)
Ms. Deboi also initially denied multiple times that Mr. Mobley had ever threatened
to seek custody of their daughter during their alleged fight.
p.172, L.15.)

(Trial Tr., p.171, L. 25 -

However, Mr. Mobley presented Ms. Deboi with her sworn statement,

tendered in seeking a no contact order, in which she represented to the court that,
during the argument, Mr. Mobley had threatened to take their daughter away based on
his belief that Ms. Deboi was an unfit mother.

(Trial Tr., p.172, L.16 - p.173, L.17.)

When Mr. Mobley asked Ms. Deboi whether she had withheld their daughter from
Mr. Mobley following the alleged altercation, the district court sustained the State's
objection that this evidence was irrelevant. (Trial Tr., p.173, Ls.18-22.) Ms. Deboi also
6

admitted during cross-examination that she drained between $2,500 and $2,600 in two
days immediately after this fight. (Trial Tr., p.173, L. 24 - p.174, L.16.) She denied that
she did so in order to prevent Mr. Mobley from having any money upon his release or
from getting a lawyer in order to obtain custody of his daughter. (Trial Tr., p.175, L.25 p.176, L.6.)
Ms. Voss was the next witness presented by the State. Ms. Voss testified that, in
the early evening hours of the night of the alleged battery, she saw Ms. Deboi briefly.
(Trial Tr., p.182, L.12- p.185, L.9.) According to Ms. Voss' testimony, they talked for a
short time, but Ms. Deboi never left her truck during this conversation. (Trial Tr., p.184,
L.23 - p.186, L.25.) Ms. Voss testified that Ms. Deboi appeared to be in shock and had
a white mark on her face that was developing a bluish tinge around the edges. (Trial
Tr., p.187, L.12 - p.188, L.24.) Ms. Voss believed that the mark on Ms. Deboi's face
looked like a bruise was about to develop there. (Trial Tr., p.187, L.23 - p.188, L.2.)
The next witness for the State was Ms. Hone. (Trial Tr., p.194, Ls.23-25.) She
testified that she and her friend, Tanya Ambler, were having a barbeque with some
other people at her house on the night of the alleged altercation when Ms. Deboi
arrived. (Trial Tr., p.196, Ls.3-22.) Ms. Hone also testified that, when Ms. Deboi came
into the house, she had a large bruise and a lump on her face near her eye.
Tr., p.197, Ls.8-19.)

(Trial

Although Ms. Hone wanted Ms. Deboi to go to a hospital,

Ms. Deboi was initially resistant to the idea. (Trial Tr., p.197, Ls.20-25.)
According to Ms. Hone's testimony, Ms. Deboi became dizzy about 10-15
minutes after arriving at Ms. Hone's house. At this point, Ms. Deboi agreed to go to a
hospital.

(Trial Tr., p.197, L.24 - p.198, L.5.)

contacted the police.

Neither Ms. Deboi nor Ms. Hone

(Trial Tr., p.198, Ls.12-25.) In addition to the bruising and the
7

lump on Ms. Deboi's face, Ms. Hone testified that she also saw a shoe-like imprint on
Ms. Deboi's neck. (Trial Tr., p.199, L.21 -p.200, L.2.)
During cross-examination, Ms. Hone admitted that her prior statement to police
put Ms. Deboi's arrival at her home significantly later in the evening than her testimony
at trial - at approximately 7: 15 as opposed to her trial testimony that Ms. Deboi arrived
at approximately 6:00. (Trial Tr., p.196, L.23 - p.197, L.3, p.201, Ls.7-11.) When asked
if Ms. Deboi stated whether she had gone somewhere else between her apartment and
Ms. Hone's house, Ms. Hone initially testified that Ms. Deboi claimed that she came
straight to Ms. Hone's house. (Trial Tr., p.202, Ls.5-19.) Ms. Hone then corrected her
testimony and said that Ms. Deboi had not indicated one way or the other as to whether
she had gone anywhere else before arriving at Ms. Hone's house.

(Trial Tr., p.202,

Ls.20-23.) Ms. Hone also admitted that, at the time of the alleged altercation, she and
her husband owed money to Mr. Mobley. (Trial Tr., p.203, Ls.3-17.) But she claimed
that there was no real tension between herself and Mr. Mobley despite the fact that she
had not yet repaid this debt. (Trial Tr., p.203, Ls.16-22.)
Ms. Ambler, who was also present at Ms. Hone's home when Ms. Deboi arrived
there, was the next witness to testify for the State.

(Trial Tr., p.205, Ls.9-11.)

She

testified that, when Ms. Deboi arrived at Ms. Hone's home, Ms. Deboi's eye was very
swollen and she looked like she had been crying. (Trial Tr., p.206, L.24 - p.207, L.6.)
Notably, and contrary to Ms. Deboi's testimony that Mr. Mobley had snapped her phone
in half, Ms. Ambler saw Ms. Deboi's phone largely intact. According to Ms. Ambler,
Ms. Deboi claimed that Mr. Mobley had merely removed the SIM 3 card from the phone.
(Tr., p.148, Ls.5-7; p.207, Ls.10-16.) Ms. Ambler testified that it was Ms. Deboi who

3

Subscriber Identification Module.
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slammed the phone down on the ground - and that there was nothing that appeared
unusual about the phone other than the missing SIM card that Ms. Deboi claimed was
taken by Mr. Mobley. (Trial Tr., p.207, Ls.12-16, p.211, L.20 - p.212, L.6.)
Ms. Ambler testified that Ms. Deboi did not want to call the police, but she did
eventually end up going to the hospital once she began to feel dizzy and nauseous.
(Trial Tr., p.209, Ls.18-24.) Ms. Ambler further stated that Ms. Deboi never indicated
whether she had been anywhere else between leaving her apartment and arriving at
Ms. Hone's residence. (Trial Tr., p.210, Ls.9-13.)
The next witness presented by the State was Nampa police officer Brandon
Moerles. (Trial Tr., p.214, Ls.21-25.) Officer Moerles was dispatched to the hospital on
the night of the alleged altercation based upon a report of a potential domestic violence
incident.

(Tr., p.215, L.24 - p.216, L.9.)

Based upon Ms. Deboi's responses to the

officer in investigating the report, the officer testified that he had determined that a crime
had occurred. Officer Moerles further testified that he determined that the crimes were
domestic battery and attempted strangulation. (Trial Tr., p.217, Ls.12-24.) He testified
that he based this conclusion both on Ms. Deboi's statements to him and on the injuries
that he observed - a black eye, a "rug burn" and red marks on Ms. Deboi's neck. (Trial
Tr., p.218, Ls.1-7.)

Officer Moerles also testified that Mr. Mobley became a suspect

based upon his investigation. (Trial Tr., p.218, Ls.11-15.)
Following his interview with Ms. Deboi, Officer Moerles went to Mr. Mobley's
home to question him. (Trial Tr., p.218, L.25 - p.219, L.15.) The officer testified that,
Mr. Mobley had an injury on his hand where two of Mr. Mobley's fingers were taped
together. (Trial Tr., p.220, Ls.9-13.) This injury was the result of an accident that had
happened four days prior to the alleged altercation between Mr. Mobley and Ms. Deboi.
9

(Trial Tr., p.220, Ls.14-18.) The officer did not take any photographs of Mr. Mobley's
hand or ask him whether he had been injured by Ms. Deboi. (Trial Tr., p.220, L.21 p.221, L.2, p.224, Ls.6-20.)

He also did not see any disturbance or any sign of a

struggle in the bedroom where the altercation was alleged to have taken place, or any
signs of any items that were out of place or broken. (Trial Tr., p.226, L.20 - p.227, L.6.)
Officer Bryce Martin of the Nampa police department also testified on behalf of
the State. (Trial Tr., p.232, Ls.17-23.) As with Officer Moerles, Officer Martin also was
dispatched to the hospital based upon a report of a suspected domestic violence
incident against Ms. Deboi. (Trial Tr., p.234, L.22 - p.235, L.3.) Officer Martin also took
pictures of Ms. Deboi's injuries while he was at the hospital. The officer testified that he
observed that Ms. Deboi had a black and swollen eye and red marks on Ms. Deboi's
neck. (Trial Tr., p.236, Ls.4-18.) He believed that the marks on Ms. Deboi's neck were
indicative of an attempted strangulation. (Trial Tr., p.237, Ls.2-5.)
After investigating at the hospital, Officer Martin likewise went to Mr. Mobley's
home for further investigation.

(Trial Tr., p.237, Ls.13-17.)

While there, the officer

spoke with Mr. Mobley's young daughter, M.M. (Trial Tr., p.238, Ls.5-13.) M.M. was 5
years old at the time. (Trial Tr., p.238, Ls.5-13.) Without objection, the officer testified
that M.M. eventually was willing to speak to Officer Martin; that her comments indicated
that something happened at the apartment and that there was a particular suspect; and
that this suspect was Mr. Mobley.

(Trial Tr., p.238, L.18 - p.239, L.4.) M.M. never

testified at trial. (See Trial Tr., generally.)
Following Officer Martin's testimony, the State called Miranda Stone to the stand.
(Trial Tr., p.244, Ls.12-16.) Ms. Stone stated that she was a mutual friend of Ms. Deboi
and Mr. Mobley. (Trial Tr., p.244, L.19 - p.245, L.15.) She testified that Mr. Mobley had
10

sent her a text message on the night of the alleged altercation, and they subsequently
spoke on the phone that night. (Trial Tr., p.236, L.8 - p.247, L.16.) Ms. Stone was
apparently storing some of Mr. Mobley's belongings.

According to her testimony,

Mr. Mobley had initially sent her a text message indicating that he wished to retrieve
them.

(Trial Tr., p.247, Ls.7-16.)

In response, Ms. Stone called Mr. Mobley.

(Trial

Tr., p.247, Ls.17-20.)
Ms. Stone testified that, during this conversation, Mr. Mobley stated that he had
"popped" Ms. Deboi. (Trial Tr., p.248, Ls.13-17.) When asked what he meant by this
statement, Ms. Stone represented that Mr. Mobley said he had given Ms. Deboi a
"shiner." (Trial Tr., p.248, Ls.16-19.) According to Ms. Stone, Mr. Mobley stated that he
and Ms. Deboi had been in an argument about Ms. Deboi's family. (Trial Tr., p.248,
L.20 - p.249, L.21.)

On cross-examination, Ms. Stone admitted that she and

Mr. Mobley were having a disagreement regarding some of the property she was storing
for him - specifically as to the ownership of this property. (Trial Tr., p.251, L.22 - p.252,
L.22.)
The State thereafter rested its case.

(Trial Tr., p.255, Ls.17-19.) Mr. Mobley

then presented his first witness - his boss, Shana Gentry.
p.257, L.2.)

(Trial Tr., p.256, L.12 -

Ms. Gentry testified that Mr. Mobley was an excellent employee who

always worked very well with the tenants in the apartment complex where he did
maintenance work.

(Trial Tr., p.257, L.23 - p.258, L.10.)

While Ms. Gentry never

observed any instances where Mr. Mobley was angry with Ms. Deboi, she did see
Ms. Deboi get in "disputes" with Mr. Mobley.

(Trial Tr., p.259, Ls.18-24.) She also

testified that she never had any problems with Mr. Mobley consuming alcohol in the
course of his employment. (Trial Tr., p.259, L.25 - p.260, L.5.)
11

Mr. Mobley's mother, Sharon McDonald, was the next witness for the defense.
(Trial Tr., p.260, L.21 - p.261, L.3.) The day after the alleged altercation, Ms. McDonald
went to Mr. Mobley's residence to pick up some of his things. (Trial Tr., p.261, L.24 p.262, L.7.) But when Ms. McDonald went back to the house on another occasion to
pick up more of Mr. Mobley's property, Ms. McDonald noticed that several of her and
Mr. Mobley's things were missing.

(Trial Tr., p.262, Ls.10-12.)

This included a

television, a video game console, and numerous other items that were antiques from
Ms. McDonald's family that she had asked Mr. Mobley to store for her. (Trial Tr., p.263,
L.21 - p.265, L.18.) Ms. McDonald also testified that she had never seen Mr. Mobley
have a quick temper or engage in violence. (Trial Tr., p.267, Ls.1-6.)
D.M., another of Mr. Mobley's daughters, also testified on her father's behalf.
(Trial Tr., p.271, L.20 - p.272, L.8.) D.M. testified about statements related to her by
Ms. Deboi as impeachment of Ms. Deboi's prior testimony regarding an incident that
took place at a fast food restaurant.

(Trial Tr., p.273, Ls.10-19.) According to D.M.,

Ms. Deboi had told D.M. that she had assaulted one of the workers at this restaurant by
pulling the woman over the counter and then repeatedly kicking her. (Trial Tr., p.274,
Ls.4-19.) Ms. Deboi told D.M. about the incident to explain why Ms. Deboi was not
allowed to return to the restaurant to eat. (Trial Tr., p.274, Ls.16-19.) Ms. Deboi also
had apparently made other admissions about going to parties and fighting with other
people present there.

(Trial Tr., p.275, Ls.7-11.)

However, D.M. had never seen

Mr. Mobley and Ms. Deboi engaging in any violent confrontation and had never seen
her father hit anyone - including herself. (Trial Tr., p.275, L.22 - p.276, L.8.)
Mr. Mobley testified on his own behalf.

(Trial Tr., p.279, Ls.7-8.)

He

acknowledged that he and Ms. Deboi were fighting on the night in question about
12

various things, including custody of their shared daughter.

(Trial Tr., p.279, L.16 -

p.281, L.7.) But Mr. Mobley denied that the verbal argument they were having ever
turned physical. (Trial Tr., p.282, Ls.14-23.) In fact, he testified that he would not have
been able to strangle Ms. Deboi or hit her with a closed fist. (Trial Tr., p.284, Ls.2-10.)
This was because, as was testified to by Officer Martin, Mr. Mobley had a prior injury to
his hand which required several of his fingers to be taped together - one of his fingers
had been dislocated and he could not even close his hand or grip anything with any real
degree of strength. (Trial Tr., p.284, L.11 - p.285, L.7.)
Given the extent of their fight, Mr. Mobley believed that his relationship with
Ms. Deboi was ending, particularly in light of the fact that Ms. Deboi threatened to
withhold his youngest daughter from him and even told him that she would not let
Mr. Mobley ever see his daughter again. (Trial Tr., p.283, Ls.4-23.) Mr. Mobley also
indicated his intent to seek custody of their daughter.

(Trial Tr., p.285, Ls.8-15.)

Following this verbal argument, Mr. Mobley testified that Ms. Deboi took their daughter
and left. (Trial Tr., p.286, Ls.1-3.) He only found out that Ms. Deboi accused him of
becoming violent later on when police arrived at his home around midnight.

(Trial

Tr., p.287, L.20 - p.288, L.5.)
Following his arrest, Mr. Mobley testified that he was unable to post bail on his
own because all of the funds in his account - nearly $4,000 by his estimate - had been
taken out of his account. (Trial Tr., p.290, Ls.18-25.) After he asked his mother to go to
his house and retrieve his belongings, Mr. Mobley also found out that several items of
his property had been taken - his television, antiques, titles to all of Mr. Mobley's
vehicles, his bicycles, and "anything that was worth any amount of money," had been
removed from his home. (Trial Tr., p.292, Ls.2-8.) Mr. Mobley also denied having told
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Ms. Stone that he had hit Ms. Deboi. (Trial Tr., p.292, Ls.9-17.) He did, however, admit
that he had consumed about three beers on the day of his fight with Ms. Deboi. (Trial
Tr., p.296, Ls.4-6.) Mr. Mobley was the last witness on behalf of the defense. (Trial
Tr., p.303, Ls.14-18.)
During the course of the jury's deliberations, the jury sent the district court a note
that said, "We're split on one of the charges. How do we proceed with the charge we're
split on?" (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.6-10.) To this, the district court admonished the jurors to
re-read a single paragraph from one of the jury instructions that read as follows:
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views, and deliberate
with the objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without
disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you must decide this case for
yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and consideration of
the case with your fellow jurors.
(Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.11-12; Jury Instruction 28.) In conjunction with directing the jurors
solely to this paragraph, the district court further told the jurors to, "continue to
deliberate." (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.11-12.) When asked by the court whether he objected
to the actions taken by the court, Mr. Mobley did not object. (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.15-17.)
The jury acquitted Mr. Mobley of the offense of attempted strangulation, but
convicted him of felony domestic battery and further found that he had committed this
offense within the presence of a child. (Trial Tr., p.332, L.25 - p.334, L.14; R., p.82-85.)
Mr. Mobley was sentenced to four and one-half years, with one and one-half years
fixed, upon his conviction; but the district court thereafter suspended Mr. Mobley's
sentence and placed him on probation for three years. (6/27/11 Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.14,
L.6; R., pp.105-107.) Mr. Mobley timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and
sentence. (R., p.109.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court violate Mr. Mobley's right to due process when the court provided
the jury with a "dynamite" instruction upon being informed that the jury was deadlocked
as to one of the counts in this case?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Violated Mr. Mobley's Right To Due Process When The Court
Provided The Jury With A "Dynamite" Instruction Upon Being Informed That The Jury
Was Deadlocked As To One Of The Counts In This Case

Introduction

A.

Mr. Mobley asserts that the district court violated his due process rights when the
district court provided the jury with a "dynamite" instruction upon the court being
informed that the jurors were deadlocked with regard to one of the two charged offenses

8.

Standard Of Review
Whether the jury was correctly instructed by the district court is an issue of law

that this Court reviews de nova. See, e.g., State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-588
(2011).

C.

The District Court Violated Mr. Mobley's Right To Due Process When The Court
Provided The Jury With A "Dynamite" Instruction Upon Being Informed That The
Jury Was Deadlocked As To One Of The Counts In This Case, And This Error
Rose To The Level Of A Fundamental Error
Mr. Mobley asserts that the district court's instruction to the jury, upon being

informed that the jury was deadlocked and without prior consultation with counsel, was
an impermissible "dynamite" instruction that violated his right to due process and rose to
the level of a fundamental error.
As an initial matter, Mr. Mobley did not object after being informed - after the fact
- of the action already taken by the district court in providing the challenged dynamite
instruction and ordering the jury to continue to deliberate. (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.6-17.)
However, Mr. Mobley asserts that, because he was never afforded the opportunity to
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make a contemporaneous objection in order to prevent this error, the three-part test for
fundamental error should not apply in this case.
Under this test, allegations of error that were not objected to at trial must meet
three standards: (1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of his or her
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be plain from the record
without the need of additional information, including information as to whether the failure
to object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning that there is a "reasonable
possibility that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial." State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). The primary purpose of the fundamental error test is to
encourage the making of contemporaneous objections to proposed actions by the
district court in order to afford the trial court the opportunity to continue and resolve
potential errors.

Id. at 224.

In doing so, the appellate courts in Idaho seek to

"encourage the making of timely objections that result in the error being prevented or
the harm being alleviated." Id. at 226.
In this case, however, the district court unilaterally responded to and instructed
the jury prior to ever giving Mr. Mobley or the State a chance to object to its instructions
and avoid the prejudice that resulted. Accordingly, under unusual circumstances such
as these where the district court takes it upon itself to instruct the jury without affording
trial counsel an opportunity to object, Mr. Mobley asserts that the three-part test for
fundamental error should not apply given that he was deprived by the court's actions of
having the opportunity to raise an objection before the error had occurred. 4

4

However, Mr. Mobley also asserts that, even if this Court applies the fundamental error
test applies under these facts, he meets this test.
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"A dynamite instruction is one that directs a deadlocked jury to continue
deliberating and exhorts those jurors holding a minority view to reconsider their
position." State v. Gomez, 137 Idaho 671, 676 (2002) (quoting State v. Hernandez, 133
Idaho 576, 586 (Ct. App. 1999)). In order to avoid exerting undue influence upon or
coercing a jury, Idaho has adopted a "blanket prohibition against dynamite instructions."
Id. (quoting State v. Flint, 114 Idaho 806, 812 (1988)).

Even prior to the Idaho Supreme Court placing a blanket prohibition against the
use of dynamite instructions in Idaho, the Idaho Court of Appeals presaged this holding
in

State v.

Clay,

wherein the Court of Appeals explained the constitutional

underpinnings of prohibiting such instructions:
Jury verdicts occupy an exalted place in our criminal justice system.
When a properly instructed jury makes a finding of guilt upon admissible
evidence, its finding must be upheld if "any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
An appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of a jury
regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight of their testimony, or the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
This vast
deference to jury verdicts can be justified only if the integrity of the jury
Moreover, the
deliberation process is scrupulously maintained.
constitutional guaranty of due process demands that an accused person
receive a fair and impartial trial.
This guaranty is violated if jury
deliberations are tainted by undue pressure.
State v. Clay, 112 Idaho 261,263 (Ct. App. 1987) (internal citations omitted).

Based upon the pressures exerted by the district court in exhorting the jury to
continue deliberating, coupled with the specific attention drawn by the trial court to the
time and expenses that had been invested into the trial by the parties, the Clay court
found that the trial court's instruction to the jury to continue deliberation exerted undue
pressure on the jury and reversed the defendant's conviction. Clay, 112 Idaho at 263268.
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One year later, the Idaho Supreme Court put to rest any future use of dynamite
instructions when the trial court is confronted with a deadlocked jury. Flint, 114 Idaho at
810-813.

The Flint Court recognized that the use of a dynamite instruction was of

constitutional dimension, adopting the reasoning of the court in Clay and reiterating that,
"the constitutional guarantee of due process demands that an accused person receive a
This guarantee is violated if jury deliberations are tainted by

fair and impartial trial.

undue pressure." Id. at 810 (quoting Clay, 112 Idaho at 263). In light of this concern, in
conjunction with policy considerations, the Court in Flint held that, "[o]nly a blanket
prohibition against dynamite instructions will sufficiently protect the deadlocked jurors
from coercion." Id. at 812. While this prohibition does not prohibit a trial court from
polling the jurors and - depending upon the responses of the jurors as a result of this
inquiry - guiding them toward another period of deliberation, the Court cautioned
against doing so if the jurors declared themselves deadlocked. Id. at 813.
The constitutional dimension of this prohibition was re-affirmed by the Idaho
Court of Appeals in State v. Timmons, 141 Idaho 376, 376-379 (Ct. App. 2005). The
Timmons Court noted that, if jury deliberations are tainted by undue pressure from the

court, the due process guarantee of the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury is
violated.

Id. at 377.

While the court in Timmons did not find that the trial court's

instructions in that case constituted an improper dynamite instruction, the court's
holding rested on grounds that are not present here.

Namely, in Timmons, the jury

never indicated a definite split on the charge at issue, and the presiding juror
affirmatively indicated that it was possible that a verdict could be reached if
deliberations continued.

Id. at 376-377.

Additionally, the district court in Timmons

never directed the juror holding a minority view to reconsider their positions. Id. In light
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of this, the Timmons Court held that the instruction to continue deliberating was
permissible; and that there was no need to inform the jurors regarding jury deadlock
since the jurors affirmatively indicated that a verdict was possible.
In contrast, in this case the jury informed the district court that they were actually
split on one of the charges. (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.7-9.) There was no indication that the
jury believed, that with further deliberation, this deadlock could be resolved. Unlike the
trial court in Timmons, the district court did not inquire further as to whether this
deadlock could be resolved prior to ordering the jury to continue deliberating.

(Trial

Tr., p.332, Ls.7-12.) And - as a critical distinction from Timmons - the jury was further
exhorted to consider a single paragraph from the jury instructions that directed the
jurors to re-consider their views with the objective of reaching a verdict.

(Trial

Tr., p.332, Ls.6-12; Instruction 28.) Accordingly, a different result should be reached in
this case.
Moreover, even prior to Idaho's prohibition against the use of dynamite
instructions, Idaho courts were careful to caution that such instructions must be
provided to the jury along with, and in the context of, all of the other instructions in a
given case so as to avoid any undue influence or pressure upon the jury. See, e.g.,
State v. Bailey, 94 Idaho 285, 292 (1971) (overruled by Flint, 114 Idaho at 810-813).
However, the exact opposite occurred in this case.

Rather than instruct the jury to

consider the jury instructions in their entirety, or even to consider Instruction 28 as a
whole, the district court in this case directed the jurors to continue to deliberate after
telling them to re-read only paragraph 6 of Instruction 28.
This exhortation on the part of the trial court was specifically in response to the
jurors' query as to what they should do next, given that they were split on one of the
20

charges. (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.6-12.) Accordingly, the court's response to go back and
continue deliberations only was an incomplete response to the jury's query, given that
the district court did not reveal to the jurors that a verdict was not necessary and that a
mistrial could be declared if they were deadlocked.

This instruction therefore could

have misled the jury into the false belief that they were required to reach a verdict,
regardless of whether the jurors were individual split in their personal belief as to guilt or
innocence. See Gomez, 137 Idaho at 677 (reversing the defendant's conviction where
the court's instruction may have left the jury with the erroneous impression as to the
effect of a deadlock).
As important, the court's response directed the jurors to only a portion of the jury
instruction regarding conduct during deliberations -

and only that portion that

encouraged the jurors to re-examine their own views "with the objective of reaching an
agreement." (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.6-12; Instruction 28.) The district court specifically
omitted the paragraph that followed. This is significant, particularly in light of the jurors'

query, because the paragraph omitted by the district court provided that no juror,
"should surrender your honest opinion as to the weight or effect of the evidence or as to
the innocence or guilt of the defendant because the majority of the jury feels otherwise
or for the purpose of returning a unanimous verdict." (Instruction 28.) This likely left the
jurors with the impression that, despite the split of opinion on the jurors as to guilt or
innocence, they were absolutely required to continue to deliberate until a verdict was
actually reached. Such an instruction would likewise mislead the jury. See Gomez, 137
Idaho at 677.
Moreover, this error was plain from the record and the failure to object was not
the result of reasonable trial strategy. Mr. Mobley in this case, by pleading not guilty to
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the charges, expressly invoked his right to a jury trial. This right necessarily carries with
it, as a fundamental guarantee of due process, the right to a fair and impartial jury that is
not tainted in its deliberations by coercion. "The right to a fair and impartial jury goes to
the foundation of the right to a fair trial." State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590, 601 (Ct. App.
1992). This right to a jury trial by a fair and impartial jury is personal to the defendant,
and cannot be waived by the strategic choice of trial counsel.

See, e.g., State v.

Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 742 (Ct. App. 2003) (noting the right to a jury trial as among
those fundamental rights that can only be waived by the defendant personally).
Additionally, there is no apparent strategic advantage to Mr. Mobley in not
objecting to the coercive pressures applied by the district court in using this instruction.
The Court of Appeals in Clay recognized that the result of a jury deadlock will quite
often be that the State will re-examine the strength of its case and the wisdom of
seeking to retry the defendant. "Where jurors honestly have tried and failed to reach a
verdict, the prosecutor undoubtedly will reexamine the case. In some instances, a new
trial may be requested; in others, the jury's inability to agree may be allowed to stand as
the last official word on the issue of the defendant's guilt." Clay, 112 Idaho at 264. This
is particularly true where, as here, there has already been one previous trial during
which a unanimous verdict was not possible.

Under such circumstances, a third

attempt at retrial was far less likely and a mistrial would likely "stand as the last official
word" on Mr. Mobley's guilt.
Finally, there is a reasonable possibility that this error contributed to the jury's
verdict. First, it is notable that the first jury in this case was unable to render a verdict
on any of the State's charges, and therefore a mistrial had to be declared. (R., pp.3953.) Several courts have considered this a factor in showing the prejudice of dynamite
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instructions. Clay, 112 Idaho at 268. Additionally, this case was largely a contest of
credibility between Ms. Deboi and Mr. Mobley - while Ms. Deboi was apparently injured
at some point on the night in question, only the testimony of these two witnesses
directly addressed where the source of those injuries arose. This is likewise a factor
that has been considered as showing the potential prejudice of such an instruction.
Clay, 112 Idaho at 268. Finally, given the relatively short duration between the district

court's instruction to the jurors to continue deliberating and reconsider their views, and
the resulting verdict that was announced, there is ever possibility that the pressure from
the district court to reach a verdict in this case contributed to Mr. Mobley's resulting
conviction.
The district court in this case improperly pressured and coerced the jury to reach
a verdict, and failed to properly instruct the jury as to the fact that a unanimous verdict
was not strictly required. This deprived Mr. Mobley of his constitutional right to a fair
trial and to a fair and impartial jury.

Accordingly, Mr. Mobley asks that this Court

reverse his judgment of conviction and sentence and remand this case for further
proceedings.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Maynard respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction and sentence, and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this

th day of November, 2012.

SARAHE.TOINS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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